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1. Introduction 
 
The welfare state1 in Korea2 has evolved over the past forty years from a bare structure with a 
minimal number of programmes into fairly comprehensive systems. During this time, Korea has 
acquired distinctive characteristics. One of the important rationales for social policy in the East 
Asian region was ‘welfare developmentalism’ which saw social policy as an instrument for 
economic development (Goodman & White, 1998). In fact, social policy did indeed prove to be 
one of the most effective policy instruments during the period of rapid economic growth in as 
Korea. This paper will argue that such policy rationale has given distinctive characteristics to 
the welfare state in Korea, which can be summarized as the developmental welfare state (Kwon, 
2005), and that it has become more inclusive after the reform. In this paper we will first trace 
back to the formation of the developmental welfare state in Korea and analyzed the underlying 
rationale of subsequent reform in the late 1990s. It will also identify future challenges for Korea 
in order to maintain developmental credentials of social policy and provide adequate social 
protection to her citizens. Lastly, this paper will attempt to elicit policy implications for other 
developing countries to consider for improving their social protection system. 
 
 
2. The Structure of the Welfare State in Korea 
 
The Korean welfare state was, by and large, brought into effect by the military government 
which took power after a coup d’etat in 1961 (Kwon, 1999). The welfare state comprises four 
social insurance programmes, one social assistance programme, the Minimum Living Standard 
Guarantee, and three public pensions programmes for special categories of people such civil 
servants, private school teachers and military personnel. The first social welfare programme 
introduced was Industrial Accident Insurance in 1963 along with a pilot programme for health 
insurance. At the beginning Industrial Accident Insurance covered people in workplace of 500 
employees or more. Since then the number of the workplaces covered by Industrial Accident 
Insurance has increased, and at present the workplace with more than one regular employee 
should join in the programme, and 44 per cent of employed people are covered in 2005.3  
 
National Health Insurance, the second contour of the Korea’s welfare state, originates from a 
pilot programme for health insurance which was tried for ten years from 1965. It became a 
compulsory programme in 1977, beginning to protect the workers of the large scale industrial 
enterprises, public sector workers and private school teachers. By 1987, most employees in the 
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industrial sectors had access to health care through National Health Insurance, while the self-
employed, farmers and others without employers fell outside it. This was partly because it was 
difficult to administer actuarial work for them. Another difficulty in including such group of 
people in National Health Insurance was that they did not have employers to pay half the 
contributions (Goodman, White, & Kwon, 1998). National Health Insurance was financed by 
arrangements in which both employers and employees to pay each half contribution. Since the 
state only provides administration cost, those people without employers could not join in the 
programme. In 1988/89, the democratically elected government extended National Health 
Insurance to all the population, providing financial subvention for those people outside National 
Health Insurance. 
 
The third main programme is the National Pension Programme. It was first considered for 
introduction in the early 1970s, but implementation was postponed due to the oil crisis in 1973. 
It was eventually reintroduced in 1988. Due to the insurance arrangement, the National Pension 
Programme, like National Health Insurance, began with wage earning employees, and by 1994 
it covered 26.7 per cent of the working population (Kwon, 1999). In 1999, Kim Dae-jung 
government expanded the programme to the farmers, the self-employed and those with short-
term contracts, although they could choose not to join in the programme. Currently, National 
Pension Programme has a huge reserve of fund since it has not yet disbursed full pensions 
because of the requirement of twenty-year contributions.  
 
The Employment Insurance Programme was implemented in 1995. Nevertheless, its history 
goes back to 1963 when the military government of Park Chung Hee first considered its 
introduction. Instead of unemployment insurance, the government introduced the above 
mentioned Industrial Accident Insurance. The government feared that time that unemployment 
benefits might lead to disincentives to work (Kwon, 1999). In contrast to such a policy stance, 
the 1995 introduction of the Employment Insurance Programme was a reflection of a newly 
gained confidence of the Korean government after the sustained economic development and 
democratization (Kwon, 2001). As the name of the programme implies, the Employment 
Insurance Programme comprises not only unemployment benefits but also training grants and 
job security grants. While unemployment benefits are paid to those who lose their jobs, job 
security grants subsidizes employers who retain their employees instead of laying them off. 
Training grants are paid to training institutions, private or public, for training unemployed 
people, while the unemployed are eligible for training allowances during their period of training 
(Kwon, 2001).  
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The latest programme introduced in the Korean welfare state is the Minimum Living Standard 
Guarantee (MLSG). It is a social assistance programme entirely funded by the government 
(shared by the central and local governments), replacing the previous assistance programme 
which was very limited in terms of the scope and the level of benefits. The MLSG is based on 
the concept of the relative poverty so that the poverty line it sets up is higher than one by the 
absolute concept. Secondly, it provides benefits to poor people if their income below the poverty 
line regardless of their age and family conditions. Under the previous social assistance 
programme, the poor aged between 18 and 64 were not eligible to benefits and those having 
family members who were supposed to help them were not eligible. The MLSG, nevertheless, 
has a number of work conditionality: benefit recipients should participate in training, public 
work projects or community services if they are aged between 18 and 64. 
 
A new social insurance programme under consideration is long-term care insurance. As this 
paper will highlight later, ageing is taking place fast in Korea. Among other social expenditure 
that has risen in relation to the ageing population, health care cost is the most notable one. A bill 
to introduce long-term care insurance is in the first reading in the National Assembly. The basic 
structure of the programme is social insurance, which will collect contributions from citizens 
and provide care services to the elderly who require them because of illness or frailty related to 
ageing. 
  
Overall, Table 1 shows that the social expenditure in Korea has risen steadily for the last four 
decades but more sharply in the late 1990s. Since the welfare state in Korea is mainly composed 
of compulsory social insurance programmes to which citizens and employers must pay 
contributions, the government expenditure accounts for less than half of the total social 
expenditure. However, since the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, the government expenditure 
on social welfare as well as total expenditure rose sharply4. It is mainly because of the 
introduction of the MLSG, expansion of the Employment Programmes, and National Health 
Insurance, aiming to include the wider section of the population. Are those recent social policy 
reforms in Korea pointing towards a socially inclusive and democratic welfare state? Can Korea 
maintain the developmental credentials of the welfare state while undergoing reform? 
 
 
Table 1 Social expenditure in Korea and Taiwan (as per cent of GDP) 
  1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Korea Gov’t exp 1.3 1.4 2.1 3.3 3.1 
 Total exp 5.05 7.41 9.77 8.70  
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Taiwan1 Gov’t exp 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.9 3.2 
 Total exp 2.8  4.0 (2000) 4.1 (2002) 4.6 (2004) 
1 based on GNP  
Government expenditure: expenditure directly spent by the government 
Total expenditure: expenditure on social insurance by the government, companies and households. 
Source: Yearbook of Health and Welfare Statistics (Korea) (Koh et al., 2003); Taiwan, Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of China (2005) 
 
3. Two strands of the developmental welfare states 
 
The success of the rapid economic development in Korea was due largely to the developmental 
state, which played a strategic role in the process of industrialization (Wade, 1990; White, 1988; 
Woo-Cumings, 1999). However, it was not just economic policy but also social policy that was 
institutionalized so as to be able to play a part in the overall strategy for economic development. 
Hort and Kuhnle (2000: 167-168) showed that East Asian countries, and Korea in particular, 
introduced the first social security programmes at lower levels of socio-economic development 
than the European countries. This suggests that Korea adopted the social welfare programmes as 
policy instruments for economic development. Goodman and White (1998: 17) highlighted the 
characteristics of the East Asian welfare states that were incorporated in the state developmental 
strategy: a development ideology that subordinated welfare to economic efficiency, discouraged 
dependence on the state, promoted private source of welfare, and diverted the financial 
resources of social insurance to investment in infrastructure. The welfare state in Korea is an 
ideal-typical case of the developmental use of social policy. 
 
This preoccupation with economic development led to the welfare state being predominantly 
composed of social insurance programmes for industrial workers, in which people were required 
to pay contributions prior to entitlement to social benefits as we explained above. As a result, 
only selected groups of people had access to social protection, while leaving the vulnerable 
section of the population outside the system. To avoid a demand for universal entitlement, the 
state did not provide funding for the welfare programmes, but enforced the rules, formal and 
informal, which regulated the payment of contributions for social benefits by companies and 
their employees. The social insurance programmes were operated by quasi-governmental 
agencies, working at arms-length from the government, but not, strictly speaking, a part of the 
government. 
 
Because of the selectivity of the system, the welfare state in Korea had its inevitable downside. 
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Since social policy programmes covered mainly industrial workers, the welfare states tended to 
reinforce socioeconomic inequalities. Kwon (1997) pointed out that the lion’s share of 
redistribution through social policies went to high-income earners, reflecting the fact that wage 
earners in large-scale businesses and state sector employees were the first group of people 
covered by social policy programmes. The vulnerable people in society not only suffered 
because of their difficult situation but were also stigmatized by being excluded from the welfare 
state. The authoritarian government maintained a regressive welfare system and suppressed 
dissenting voices. These characteristics of the welfare state in Korea are well summarized by the 
notion of the developmental welfare state, where elite policy makers set economic growth as the 
fundamental goal, pursue a coherent strategy to achieve it, and use social policy as an 
instrument for attaining that goal (Gough, 2001) In other words, the developmental welfare state 
comprises a set of social policy and institutions that are predominantly structured for facilitating 
economic development. 
 
The developmental use of social policy is not particularly new, nor did it originated exclusively 
from Korea. The most notable historic example is Bismarck’s social policy innovations in the 
1880s in Germany, which sought to facilitate industrialization through social insurance 
programmes, and at the same time to undermine political support for the socialist movement in 
Prussia. Here intrinsic goals of human well-being, and social justice were not considered as 
priority. The developmental welfare state in Korea before the reform in the late 1990s was 
clearly in line with the Bismarkian concept. 
 
There has also been another strand in the developmental use of social policy. A good example is 
the Scandinavian experience with active labour market policy in the 1930s. While providing 
income maintenance, this policy was designed to provide the recipients with the necessary skills 
that would enable them to enter the labour market, to make their own living and subsequently to 
contribute to economic development. This strand of welfare developmentalism was further 
elaborated by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the late 1960s and 1970s 
although it did not make a wider impact due to the economic recession in the 1970s and 
ascendancy of neo-liberal economic thinking in policy making. The key principles of the second 
strand of welfare developmentalism can be summerized as productivism, universal social 
investment and democratic governance (inclusive strand), while the Bismarckian strand has 
features of productivism, selective social investment and authoritarianism (selective strand). If 
the welfare states in East Asia before the economic crisis fell under the selective strand, will the 
recent changes transform the welfare state into the inclusive one?  
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Considerable downsides were already identified in the developmental welfare state in Korea 
before the Asian economic crisis. There were social pressure groups, some forming strong 
advocacy coalitions for more inclusive social policy, which argue for strengthening social 
protection for the poor and the vulnerable people. Nevertheless, the efforts did not prevail 
before the crisis of 1997-8. At the time of economic crisis, it became clear that the 
developmental welfare state could not cope with social challenges in economic downturn. In 
particular the developmental welfare state was not able to tackle high unemployment since it 
was couched on the assumption of full-employment (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Unemployment rate in East Asia 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Japan 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5 5.4 5.3 n.a
China 3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.6 4 4.3 4.2
Hong 
Kong 
2.8 2.2 4.7 6.2 4.9 5.1 7.3 7.9 6.8
Korea 2 2.6 7 6.3 4.1 3.8 3.1 3.4 3.5
Malaysia 2.6 2.4 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.5
Singapore 3 2.4 2.5 3.6 3.5 2.8 4.3 4.7 4
Thailand 1.1 0.9 3.4 3 2.4 2.6 1.8 2.2 2.1
Taiwan 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 3 4.6 5.2 5 4.4
Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2002, 2005.  
Figures for Japan: Japan Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistical Yearbook 2005,  
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-16.htm. 
 
Faced with a severe economic crisis, the Korean government implemented social policy reforms 
towards a more inclusive developmental welfare state. Such swift response stemmed also from 
economic considerations. Before the economic crisis, it was well observed by the government 
that productivity and international competitiveness deteriorated during the 1990s due to the rise 
of cost such as increase in wage and competition from other East Asian countries such as China, 
and Thailand (Park, 2001). Increase in wage was higher than in labour productivity in this 
period. Structural reform to overcome the crisis would inevitably create a large number of the 
unemployed, but social policy remained weak to deal with it, although the main social policy 
programmes that had started with workers were expanded beyond large-scale workplaces, and 
public assistance for the poor was limited with tight means-test. 
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Prior to the Asian economic crisis, it was true that the Korean government attempted to carry 
out economic reform towards a high technology and productivity based economy. Political 
parties, trade unions and civil society groups strongly opposed it because they feared that 
economic reform would lead to social disaster given the inadequacy of social protection. The 
Asian economic crisis forced Korean society to accept such reform, and at the same time 
produced a surprise victory for the centre-left opposition in the presidential election at the end 
of 1997. The new Korean government established a tripartite committee, which was able to 
produce a broad-based social consensus for economic reform while strengthening of the welfare 
state. Civil society organizations played an important role in this process. The Employment 
Insurance Programme, which consisted of unemployment benefits and training schemes, was 
extended and strengthened in terms of coverage and benefits, and a new social assistance 
programme was also introduced to replace the old one. The fragmented National Health 
Insurance was also integrated into a National Health Insurance Corporation. Through this 
process, the notion of social rights became an important rationale of the welfare state as well as 
economic development. Although the size of social expenditure is still half of those in Japan and 
the US, the low spending OECD countries, it is fair to say that the developmental welfare state 
in Korea has moved toward a inclusive developmental welfare state. 
 
 
4. Future Challenges: Rescaling the welfare state in the ageing society 
 
As the welfare state in Korea became more inclusive, although not as inclusive as in the West 
European Countries, it is necessary to review the scale of social benefits and to answer the 
question of whether we have appropriate expectation of social protection. Inclusion means that 
there will be more people who will get benefits from the welfare state. The question will be 
whether the welfare state can deliver the level of benefits which citizens expect while ensuring 
its financial sustainability. For example, is it realistic to expect that the public pension 
programmes will deliver the same replacement rate as it promised when it only covered a small 
section of the population? Can National Health Insurance cope with all health care demand 
given the demographic ageing with the system in which health care is provided mostly private 
hospitals? These questions have risen because the welfare state has become more inclusive.  
 
It is true that public expenditure on social protection in Korea is still low, but it set to rise 
sharply in the future is, however, and expected to reach the level of the OECD average in due 
course (Korea Republic of, 2004). It seems unlikely that the tax payers’ willingness to pay will 
match the rise. Such readiness has remained static since the welfare reform in the late 1990s. 
 8
This will lead us to the next issue. Does the Korea’s welfare state have effective control 
mechanism to check increasing social expenditure? How will the citizens share financial 
responsibility for the welfare state, and who will get what benefits? These questions would not 
have been relevant issues to those outside the system when the developmental welfare state in 
Korea was selective in nature, but once it becomes inclusive, those questions are for every one. 
Once you are in the system, you need to be responsible for maintaining the system. 
 
Another set of questions to be asked is about the priority of social policy programmes. Do we 
have a sense of balance between different social policies? When the welfare state consisted of 
only small number of programmes covering a small section of the population, top policy makers 
and policy experts in the government only paid attention to those programmes under 
consideration without due respect to the overall picture of welfare state. For example, the 
National Pension Programme was set the high replacement rate when it was introduce (it is still 
considered as too high), because it was assumed that no other social programmes would be 
available at the time of retirement. Policy makers deliberated only in respect to the programme 
without considering relationship to other social policy. Now there are comprehensive National 
Health Insurance, Minimum Income Guarantee, Employment Insurance and various education 
grants. Should we maintain high replacement rate as if there were no other social programmes 
for the elderly while it is not the case? What programmes should be our priority? 
 
In order to respond to these policy challenges it will be necessary to rescale the welfare state for 
the future. The immediate question that arises from this conviction is whether I am advocating 
for another welfare reform. Although rescaling will inevitably bring about some changes in 
social welfare programmes, rescaling is different from reforming. While reforming the welfare 
state implies a restructuring under a different rationale from those previous one. For example, 
Thatcher’s conservative government tried to ‘reform’ the welfare state, replacing the principles 
set by Beverage and Keynes with the neo-liberal paradigm (King, 1999). Pierson sees this 
reform as an attempt to dismantle the welfare state (Pierson, 1995). The policy change I am 
advocating is not reforming but rescaling the welfare state since I don’t see need to change the 
principles that the Korean society agreed during the welfare reform in the late 1990s, the 
principle that the welfare state should be socially inclusive, economically developmental and 
democratically shaped.  
 
Demographic ageing will be one of the most important issues that will face the developmental 
welfare state in Korea. It will inevitably increase the number of people who need social 
protection not only in the terms of protection against potential risks but also protection against 
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actual contingencies. It is true that demographic ageing is happening in most OECD countries 
and a great number of the developing countries as well. What is different in Korea and other 
East Asian countries is that the speed and scale of ageing is faster and greater than the other 
OECD countries. Table 3 shows that the speed of demographic ageing in Korea is even faster 
than in Japan where social policy has been restructured to meet the social need of the elderly for 
the last two decades. 
 
 
Table 3 the Speed of demographic ageing 
Year reaching the proportion of the elderly Time span  
7 % 14 % 20 % 7 to 14 % 14 to 20 % 
Korea 2000 2019 2026 19 7 
Japan 1970 1994 2006 24 12 
France 1864 1979 2020 115 41 
USA 1942 2013 2028 71 15 
Source: National Statistical Office (2001) 
 
At the same time, however, it is worth noting the other side of the story of the demographic 
ageing in Korea. The reason why Korea is witnessing the fast ageing is that she has enjoyed the 
demographic gift for the last thirty years: increasing number of working population with better 
productivity rate than the previous generation. It has been a double boost for economic growth. 
It seems that Korea will enjoy such demographic gift until some time 2020. As Figure 1 shows, 
unfortunately, however, this pay-back time is coming at the same time with demographic loss 
due to the decreasing number of children, which has taken its irreversible trend for some time. It 
is why the scale of demographic ageing is greater than other OECD countries.  
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Figure 1 Demographic Trend in Korea
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Source: National Statistical Office: www.nso.go.kr (visited January 2006) 
 
 
This demographic trend seems to suggest, first, that the demand from the elderly population for 
social protection will be increasing in the future. For example, the number of pensioners will 
rise sharply, which will put huge pressure on the pension fund. Regarding health care, health 
expenditure will soar at a high speed as the increasing number of elderly will use health care 
service while the quality of medical service they demand will be much higher and more 
expensive than before. Other social services will also be more necessary to meet the need for the 
elderly. 
 
Secondly, the decreasing number of children is not going to reduce demand for social service for 
the children. It is because the record low fertility 1.17, even lower than that of Japan, is a 
response, inter alia, to the inadequacy of the welfare state in Korea with respect to women and 
children. It has been inadequate in supporting a young nuclear family to raise their children 
while older children are still responsible for caring their ageing parents. It has also been 
inadequate for working parent to balance out their time for work and family. Low fertility is a 
response to such inadequacy of the welfare state. Of course there is a range of social issues 
underlying the low fertility such as gender equality, social mobility and educational structure, 
which cannot be directly taken care of by the welfare state. To address those weakness of the 
welfare state, new social programmes for young working parents and children will be necessary, 
which will then lead to increase in social expenditure. With these challenges whether the 
welfare state in Korea can maintain its developmental credentials will be a touch question to 
answer. 
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5. Policy Implications for other developing countries 
 
The forgoing discussions on the development of the welfare state in Korea enable me to elicit 
some policy implications as followings: 
 
 
• Social Policy in Korea before the economic crisis of 1997 was an instrumental part of 
development policies. It provided social protection primarily to the core industrial 
segments of the population, resulting in a selective form. Social policy reforms after the 
crisis was trigged by the need for structural reform in the economy, but the politics of 
democratisation facilitated the mover toward more inclusive social policy.  
 
• Korean experience clearly show that it is possible to maintain developmentalist 
economic policies while deepening democratisation.   
 
 
• Social policy reform in Korea counters the assertion that social protection could only be 
implemented after reaching high levels of economic development. Inclusive social 
policy can also be introduced at more modest levels of economic development.  
 
• Despite pressures from globalisation, social protection was extended in terms of 
coverage and strengthened in terms of quality of provision in Korea. 
 
• The experience after the Asian economic crisis shows that social policy can be an 
effective instrument for social and economic protection. Inclusive social policy can help 
the economy recover strongly, while avoiding many of the negative social effects that 
may arise after economic recession. 
 
• As the welfare state in Korea became more inclusive, it is necessary to rescale the social 
welfare programmes in the light of financial sustainability and ageing society. 
 
                                                          
1 The welfare state in this paper refers to a set of public policies and institutions that aim to protect 
citizens against poverty and social contingencies. This does not necessary mean that the level of social 
protection is adequate, nor that welfare programmes within the welfare state are comprehensive.  
2 Korea refers to the Republic of Korea in this paper throughout. 
3 Those who fall outside the programme are farmers, the self-employed and irregular employees.  
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4 This figure is, of course, much smaller than low spending OECD countries such as Japan (15.05 per 
cent in 1998), and the US (14.95 per cent) (Koh, Chang, & Lee, 2003). 
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